Opal Tower: The Debacle we had to Have
Mid this year marks twenty years since I started working in Sydney’s high-density residential industry. At the time, not many Australians lived in apartments. As a result, not many apartments were being built, and those that were, were designed primarily for the investment market. The aim was to provide just enough for the residents while maximising returns for investor owners.
The largest developer on the market back then was Meriton. It had an internal team of planners, architects, engineers, project managers, construction managers, builders and a dedicated sales and marketing division. It was a fully integrated project team. Most importantly, it had a high level of quality control, led personally by Harry Triguboff. Quality, at that time, was understood as building something to last, not just something that looked shiny. And it was ensured at every level, from planning and design to execution on site.
Other major developers such as Mirvac, Walker, Australand and Lendlease also had their own in-house design, project management, and construction teams. Developments were carried out through close collaboration between designers and builders.
Fast forward ten years and apartments have become a residence of choice for many Australians, not just for renters but increasingly for owners as well. This shift mirrors global trends. At the same time, Australian cities, particularly Sydney, began facing a serious housing shortage. The entire industry was delivering only ten to fifteen thousand dwellings annually, while demand was exceeding thirty thousand. Increasing supply was quickly identified as the key solution to the so-called affordability crisis.
At that point, I became concerned.
Knowing the industry from the inside, its true capacity across all sectors — planning, design, management, construction, certification, education, contracting relationships, finance, insurance, and quality control — I could not see how it would be possible to deliver the necessary quantity and density of housing in such a short time without quality suffering.
Quite simply, there were not enough experienced planners, designers, engineers, contractors, subcontractors, suppliers or project managers to deliver a high-quality product at scale.
Add to that the impact of outdated and inadequate regulations, insufficient education for professionals, a legal and contractual framework that is not fit for purpose, and the greed of newly-minted developers who were more interested in making a quick profit than creating lasting communities — and we end up where we are now.
Dealing with Opal Tower.
To prevent further disasters, we need integrated project teams led by experienced professionals. Residential towers are immensely more complex than office buildings and demand a higher level of care and competence. The legal and contractual framework must be adjusted to support such collaboration.
Education for professionals must also shift focus — training architects and engineers to deliver a physical built outcome, not just a series of visually impressive renderings. Professionals must be equipped to take on responsibility for the built environment and, at the same time, be protected from the whims and failures of a misaligned legal system.